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Abstract
This article examines the safeguarding and information obligations the NIS Directive imposes on operators
of essential services (OES). The Directive aims to ensure that such services are protected from disruption
by requiring OES to take “appropriate and proportionate” security measures. In this article, we look at
what this means in practice, with a focus on air transport services. We argue that OES need to identify,
assess, and address the cyber risks they face and that such risk management inevitably entails a level of
subjective judgement and difficult trade-offs. Regulators should accordingly accord OES significant
discretion. However, this raises the risk that OES will abuse their discretion, particularly by engaging in
“paper compliance”. Regulators will need to actively challenge OES to ensure that they exercise this
discretion appropriately.
Introduction
Modern critical infrastructure relies on network and information systems. Digitisation brings new
functionalities and efficiencies, but also increases risks. The more functions are performed across
interconnected systems and devices, the more opportunities for weaknesses in those systems arise and the
higher the risk of system failures or malicious attacks (collectively: “cyber risks”). This was tragically
illustrated by the recent crashes involving Boeing 737 Max airplanes in Indonesia and Ethiopia. The
incidences appear to be linked to a malfunction in an automated anti-stall software system, for which
Boeing quickly announced a software fix.1
After such a major incident, companies typically scramble to respond and mitigate damage. Some may
succeed in putting in place lasting security improvements. Yet, there is a danger that other companies will
return to a state of complacency. Reports suggest that in 2017, less than a third of the boards of FTSE 350
companies in the UK received comprehensive information on cyber risks.2 “We have only two modes:
*Researcher, Cloud Legal Project and Microsoft Cloud Computing Research Centre, both at the Centre for
Commercial Law Studies.
**Professor of Information and Communications Law and Director, Centre for Commercial Law Studies.
1G. Travis, “How the Boeing 737 Max Disaster Looks to a Software Developer” (2019), IEEE Spectrum, https:/
/spectrum.ieee.org/aerospace/aviation/how-the-boeing-737-max-disaster-looks-to-a-software-developer; K. Stacey,
“Boeing says software fix aims to prevent future crashes” (2019), Financial Times, https://www.ft.com/content
/4d1ee454-50a7-11e9-b401-8d9ef1626294 [Both accessed 15 December 2019].
2UK Government, FTSE 350 Cyber Governance Health Check Report 2017.
25(2020) 45 E.L. Rev. February © 2020 Thomson Reuters and Contributors
complacency and panic”, US energy secretary James Schlesinger reportedly observed of energy policy
in 1977.3 Much the same could arguably be said of cybersecurity policy and practice today.
The Network and Information Systems (NIS) Directive is the first comprehensive piece of EU legislation
specifically aimed at improving cybersecurity in relation to the protection of critical national infrastructure
(CNI).4 It follows a series of EU policy proposals and strategy documents issued since 2001.5
The obligations under the NIS Directive can be broadly distinguished into two categories. First,
safeguarding obligations require operators of essential services (OES) to implement cybersecurity measures
and engage in an ongoing cyber risk management process. Secondly, information obligations require the
sharing or disclosure of information, to promote transparency and raise awareness. Together, these
obligations aim to break the cycle of “complacency and panic”. The EU has adopted a similar provision
in respect of telecommunication6 and payment services,7 as well as under the General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR)8 and the e-Privacy Directive.9 This ensures a harmonised approach to cybersecurity,
with beneficial consequences in terms of establishing a body of regulatory experience, guidance and legal
certainty.
However, this article considers whether the NIS Directive is likely to lead to real improvements in the
cybersecurity of essential services in the EU or will, instead, become simply another “paper compliance”
process, promoting style over substance. First, we show that, in the absence of regulation, companies are
insufficiently incentivised to invest in cybersecurity and share relevant information. The NIS Directive
attempts to address this issue by imposing safeguarding and information obligations. However, we argue
that the NIS Directive may fail to meets its objectives for two reasons. First, cyber risk management
inherently entails subjective judgments and difficult decisions, which means that regulators will need to
accord OES a substantial level of discretion under the NIS Directive. This then raises the risk of companies
abusing that discretion to continue to pursue their own private interests to the detriment of the public
interests in cybersecurity, while doing the bare minimum to show regulators an appearance of compliance
with the NIS Directive. Secondly, we argue that some provisions of the NIS Directive, particularly
concerning incident notification, are drafted too narrowly to cover all relevant cybersecurity incidents.
Finally, we consider what regulators should do to uncover and/or discourage a paper-based compliance
approach to the NIS Directive.
The NIS Directive is not directly applicable, but obliges Member States to achieve a certain result.10
Member States have some room for manoeuvre in the transposition process, to take into account specific
national characteristics. For example, under the NIS Directive, Member States:
3Reported in G. Luft and A. Koren, “The Myth of U.S. Energy Dependence” (15 October 2013), Foreign Affairs,
http://www.iags.org/Luft_Korin_FA2013.pdf [Accessed 15 December 2019].
4Directive 2016/1148 concerning measures for a high common level of security of network and information systems
across the Union [2016] OJ L194/1.
5Commission, “Network and Information Security: Proposal for A European Policy Approach” COM(2001) 2982;
Commission, “Protecting Europe from large scale cyber-attacks and disruptions: enhancing preparedness, security
and resilience” COM(2009) 149; Joint Communication, “Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: An Open,
Safe and Secure Cyberspace” JOIN/2013/01.
6Directive 2002/21 art.13(a) on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and
services (Framework Directive) [2002] OJ L108.
7Directive 2015/2366 on payment services in the internal market [2015] OJ L337 arts 95–96.
8Regulation 2016/679 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on
the free movement of such data [2016] OJ L119 arts 32–33.
9Directive 2002/58 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic
communications sector [2002] OJ L201 art.1(1); amended by Directive 2009/136 [2009] OJ L337 arts 3–4.
10Article 288 TFEU.
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• must identify the OES with an establishment on their territory based on national threshold
requirements11;
• may designate operators in other sectors as providing essential services under national law12;
• must designate national competent authorities to monitor the application of the Directive13;
and
• must set effective, proportionate, and dissuasive penalties for infringements of the national
provisions that implement the NIS Directive.14
To illustrate how the NIS Directive has been implemented, this article examines the UK as a case study.
The UK was among the first Member States to transpose the NIS Directive in May 2018.15 The UK
Government was one of the pioneers in cybersecurity and CNI policy, setting a UKCyber Security Strategy
in 2009 and establishing a critical infrastructure resilience programme in 2010.16 The UK’s scheduled
departure from the EU on 31 October 2019 will raise further complications under the NIS Directive, as
discussed below. Further, the article draws mainly on examples from the air transport sector. The authors
consider air transport of particular interest, since it is a comparatively high-tech sector with both economic
and safety implications and inherent international features. The findings are based in part on interviews
the authors conducted with the UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) from June 2017 to June 2018.17
Why regulate the cybersecurity of critical national infrastructure?
Definition of cybersecurity
The NIS Directive defines cybersecurity as,
“the ability … to resist, at a given level of confidence, any action that compromises the availability,
authenticity, integrity or confidentiality of stored or transmitted or processed data or the related
services.”18
This definition follows the three objectives typically considered to form part of cybersecurity (commonly
referred to as CIA):
• Confidentiality:
only an authorised user can read the data stored on a computer system;
• Integrity:






15The Network and Information Systems Regulations 2018, 2018 No.506 (NIS Regulations).
16UK Cabinet Office, “Cyber Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: safety security and resilience in cyber
space” (2009); UK Cabinet Office, “Sector Resilience Plan for Critical Infrastructure 2010” (2010).
17The authors are grateful to colleagues at the UK Civil Aviation Authority for generously sharing their time,
information, and insights. Notes of the interviews are on file with the authors.
18NIS Directive art.4(2).
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• Availability:
authorised users can access the data stored on the computer system on request.19
The NIS definition adds “authenticity”, meaning the “property that an entity is what it claims to be”.20
Cybersecurity and critical national infrastructure
CNI denotes a range of essential services upon which society depends. There are two main concerns for
cybersecurity in CNI provision: (1) the provider will under-invest in cybersecurity, and (2) they will fail
to share or disclose information about cybersecurity measures and breaches.
Under-investment
In theory, investment in cybersecurity should be at an “efficient” level if the cost of putting in place
prevention or mitigation measures is lower than the costs society would otherwise have suffered from
preventable incidents.21 The latter costs are a factor of the likelihood of an incident occurring and the
expected impact. The Government can attempt to manage this risk by assessing these costs and investing
in appropriate countermeasures for its own systems. However, it does not directly control investment in
cybersecurity by private entities. Instead, control over and accountability for cybersecurity in CNI are
diffused across government and industry actors. Absent regulation, the primary driver for private companies
to invest in cybersecurity stems from commercial self-interest andmarket incentives, with security breaches
being costly in terms of reinstating compromised systems, loss of valuable data assets and associated
reputational implications.22
However, private companies will generally only take into account the value of the costs they face
themselves, and—to some extent—the costs faced by their customers. They will not take account of the
wider costs to society (known as “negative externalities”). For CNI, the external costs of a security breach
are likely to be much higher than the costs that the company would suffer itself.23 Given high negative
externalities, companies may not be sufficiently incentivised to prevent or mitigate incidents to an efficient
level.24 Moreover, since a significant portion of companies’ costs may be reputational, they might choose
to mitigate harm by keeping breaches secret or by investing in public relations, instead of in security. In
addition, CNI markets are often highly concentrated.25 In the absence of strong competition, companies
might offer a lower level of security than consumers desire.26 On the demand side, consumers will likely
have insufficient information about security risks they are exposed to and even less about the appropriate
nature of the measures implemented to mitigate such risks.27 This information asymmetry makes it difficult
19D. Zissis and D. Lekkas, “Addressing Cloud Computing Security Issues” (2012) 28 Future Generation Computer
Systems 583, 586.
20ENISA, “Incident notification for DSPs in the context of the NIS Directive” (2017), p.20.
21R. Baldwin, M. Cave, M. Lodge, Understanding Regulation, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012),
p.126.
22L. Grigoriadis, “Cybersecurity Insurance and New EU Cybersecurity and Data Protection Rules” (2017) 38
Business Law Review 212.
23Commission, “Network and Information Security: Proposal for A European Policy Approach” (2001), pp.7, 18.
24C. Veljanovski, “Economic Approaches to Regulation” in R. Baldwin, Oxford Handbook of Regulation (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2010), p.21.
25The level of market concentration will differ per sector and by Member State, depending on various factors
including the extent of privatisation.
26Veljanovski, “Economic Approaches to Regulation” in Oxford Handbook of Regulation (2010), p.21.
27Veljanovski, “Economic Approaches to Regulation” in Oxford Handbook of Regulation (2010), pp.21–22;
Baldwin, Cave, and Lodge, Understanding Regulation (2012), p.18.
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to assess and compare the risks associated with various services and therefore value security.28As a result,
companies are incentivized to focus on offering new features or time to market, rather than greater security.29
All of these factors may lead to sub-optimal levels of investment.
This problem could be addressed, in part, through private lawmechanisms. For example, CNI operators
could be held liable under the tort of negligence for damages caused by cybersecurity incidents that they
should have reasonably foreseen and prevented or mitigated.30 This can force operators to internalize
previously external costs, which should increase their investment in cybersecurity to a more efficient
level.31 However, tort liability may be ineffective in case of widespread, dispersed low-cost harms. Even
if the total cost to society is high, each individual’s cost may be too low to be worth pursuing in court.
Moreover, establishing whether an operator’s cybersecurity measures were sufficient to fulfil its duty of
care is likely to be a disputed matter, requiring expert evidence and increasing the cost and risks of filing
a tortious claim.32 This suggests a need for a public law response through regulatory intervention.
Insufficient information-sharing
A second risk is that information relevant to cybersecurity will be held in silos, instead of being shared
among those that need it. On the one hand, the Government is likely to have better information about
certain attacks and threats, particularly regarding politically motivated actors or large-scale cybercrime.33
On the other hand, private companies may have better information about the level of security offered by,
and breaches of, their own systems.34 The Government can choose to disclose the information it holds and
encourage private-sector information-sharing. Yet, in the absence of regulation, it cannot determine the
level of information private companies will choose to share.
Information-sharing is likely to benefit cybersecurity, particularly in relation to known vulnerabilities,
digital security measures and past attacks. Admittedly, secrecy can improve the security of physical
defences (also called “security by obscurity”). In the physical world, looking for vulnerabilities in defences
is costly for attackers as doing so puts them in physical danger.35 However, in cyberspace, attackers can
mount repeated attacks on a network at low cost; probing firewalls or scanning computers for open ports
without much risk of repercussions. Given repeated low-cost attacks, information-sharing is likely to be
a more effective tactic than secrecy in cybersecurity.36 In other contexts, secrecy may improve security
(also called “security by obscurity”), such as in relation to physical defences. Nonetheless, advocates of
open source software argue that revealing system details improves cybersecurity by enabling peer review
and patching. Hiding such details harms security: if attackers share information, they can learn about
vulnerabilities quickly, while defenders do not know where to patch.37
28Commission, “Network and Information Security: Proposal for A European Policy Approach” (2001), p.7.
29Commission, “Network and Information Security: Proposal for A European Policy Approach” (2001), p.18.
30C. Kimber, “Company Liability for Negligent Data Management in the Digital Age” (2016) 28 Computer and
Telecommunications Law Review 204, 205.
31Baldwin, Cave, and Lodge, Understanding Regulation (2012), pp.126–127.
32Baldwin, Cave, and Lodge, Understanding Regulation (2012), pp.126–127.
33M.Dunn Cavelty, “25: Cyber-security” in A. Collins,Contemporary Security Studies (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2012), p.19.
34Cavelty, “25: Cyber-security” in Contemporary Security Studies (2012), p.19.
35Cavelty, “25: Cyber-security” in Contemporary Security Studies (2012), pp.34–36, 42–45.
36Cavelty, “25: Cyber-security” in Contemporary Security Studies (2012), pp.31, 42.
37P. Swire, “AModel for when Disclosure helps Security: what is Different about Computer and Network Security?”
in M. Grady and F. Parisi, The Law and Economics of Cyber Security, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2006), pp.29–30; R. Anderson, “Why information security is hard”, Conference ACSAC’01, IEEE Computer Society
(2001), pp.6–7. For a contrasting view, see D. Miessler, “Secrecy (Obscurity) is a valid security layer” (2019), https:
//danielmiessler.com/study/security-by-obscurity/ [Accessed 15 December 2019].
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Yet market forces do not necessarily encourage such beneficial information-sharing. Sharing information
on past breaches could lead to liability or reputational damage. Airlines may prefer to keep a security
breach secret, since negative press coverage could scare customers away from their service.38 Sharing a
company’s cybersecurity strategy risks revealing commercially sensitive information.39 Setting up effective
voluntary private cybersecurity information-sharing has proved problematic in practice. In 2004, the EU
established the European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) as a centre of expertise to
provide guidance and advice on cybersecurity.40 In June 2019, the EU updated ENISA’s mandate through
the EU Cybersecurity Act and renamed the organisation the European Agency for Cybersecurity.41 The
European Agency for Cybersecurity ran a voluntary information sharing programme from 2010 to 2013.42
However, the programme’s outcomes were reportedly only “partially satisfactory”, as it suffered from a
lack of participation, high membership turnover and difficulties sharing confidential information.43 In sum,
companies’ commercial self-interest may lead to information being siloed, instead of shared. This suggests
a need for regulatory intervention to promote beneficial forms of information-sharing.
What are the cybersecurity requirements of the NIS Directive?
Definition of “essential services”
In 2008, the EU Directive on European Critical Infrastructure (ECI) entered into force, with the aim of
improving the general level of protection of critical infrastructure that could, if disrupted, have cross-border
impacts.44 The Directive aimed at protection from all types of threats, with a priority given to countering
threats from terrorism. It defined ECI as,
“an asset, system or part thereof … which is essential for the maintenance of vital societal functions,
health, safety, security, economic or social well-being of people, and the disruption or destruction
of which would have a significant impact […] on at least two Member States.”45
The ECI Directive only addressed the energy and transport sectors. Subsequent expansion to other sectors
was promised, with priority given to the ICT sector.46
The NIS Directive applies to a broader range of services than the ECI Directive. It identifies two
categories of service providers: OES, which are directly responsible for CNI, and digital service providers
(DSPs).47 The NIS Directive recognises that organisations throughout the EU, including OES, rely on
certain digital services and that their disruption could have far-reaching effects on key economic and
38M. Simson, “Cyber security in aviation: The woman who saw the tsunami coming” (2016), RunwayGirlNetwork,
https://runwaygirlnetwork.com/2016/05/26/cyber-security-aviation-woman-saw-tsunami-coming/ [Accessed 16
December 2019].
39A. Aviram, “Network Responses to Network Threats: The Evolution into Private Cybersecurity Associations”
in Grady and Parisi, The Law and Economics of Cyber Security (2006), pp.154–155.
40Regulation 460/2004 establishing the European Network and Information Security Agency [2004] OJ L77;
Regulation 526/2013 concerning the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) and
repealing Regulation 460/2004 [2013] OJ L165.
41Regulation 2019/881 on ENISA (the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity) and on information and
communications technology cybersecurity certification and repealing Regulation 526/2013 [2019] OJ L151
(Cybersecurity Act).
42The European Public + Private Partnership for Resilience or “E3PR”.
43ENISA, “EP3R 2010–2013: Four years of Pan-European Public Private Cooperation” (2014), pp.10, 14–23.
44Directive 2008/114 on the identification and designation of European critical infrastructures and the assessment
of the need to improve their protection [2008] OJ L345 (ECI Directive) Recitals 1–5.
45ECI Directive art.2(a)(b).
46ECI Directive art.3(3), (4).
47NIS Directive, Recital 48.
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societal activities.48 For instance, OES may rely on cloud services as part of their IT systems. However,
DSPs are considered to present less of a risk than OES.49 This article focuses on the regulation of OES.
DSPs are subject to many of the same substantive obligations, although different rules on jurisdiction and
enforcement apply. Regulated OES are public or private entities that meet several criteria, of which the
most important are:
• they provide a listed service in one of seven CNI sectors: energy, transport, banking, financial
markets, health, drinking water, and digital infrastructure50;
and
• they operate on such a scale that their service is “essential for the maintenance of critical
societal and economic activities”.51 This depends on factors such as: the number of users
and other sectors that depend on the service; the potential impact on economic and societal
activities or public safety and its geographic spread; and any alternative means for the
provision of that service.52
Thus, OES resemble operators of ECI, but their importance is assessed at the national level: there is no
requirement that their service could impact more than one Member State. The Directive further identifies
types of service providers within each of the sectors. For example, within the sub-sector of air transport,
three types of providers are listed: airlines, airports, and air traffic control (ATC) operators.53 Member
States are required to identify OES with an establishment on their territory. In the UK, the NIS Regulations
provide the following threshold requirements for identifying OES in the air transport sector:
• any airport operator with more than 10 million annual passengers;
• any entity licensed to provide en-route ATC, and the ATC provider at any airport with more
than 10 million annual passengers; and
• any airline with more than 30 per cent of the annual passengers at any UK airport with more
than 10 million annual passengers, or with more than 10 million total annual passengers
across all UK airports.54
The CAA has not published a list of OES established in the UK. However, based on publicly available
passenger numbers for 2018, seven UK airports will likely be covered by the NIS Regulations’ thresholds:
Heathrow (80 million annual passengers), Gatwick (46 million), Manchester (28 million), Stansted (28
million), Luton (17 million), Edinburgh (14 million) and Birmingham (12 million).55 The National Air
Traffic Services (NATS) provides en route ATC and ATC for four of these seven airports. The German
company DFS provides ATC for the remaining two (Gatwick and Edinburgh) through a UK subsidiary,
while Birmingham airport has an in-house ATC.56 Further, by absolute passenger numbers for 2017,
48NIS Directive, Recital 48 art.4.
49NIS Directive, Recital 49; ENISA, “Incident notification for DSPs in the context of the NIS Directive” (2017),
p.9.
50NIS Directive, Annex II; Commission, “Communication—Making the most of NIS” COM(2017) 476, Annex 1,
pp.20, 23.
51NIS Directive, Recital 20, NIS Regulations art.5(2); rr.1(1), 8.
52NIS Directive art.6.
53NIS Directive, Annex II.
54NIS Regulations Sch.2 r.4.
55CAA, “Airport data 2018”, Table 1, https://www.caa.co.uk/Data-and-analysis/UK-aviation-market/Airlines
/Datasets/UK-Airline-data/2017/Airline-data-annual-reports-2017/ [Accessed 16 December 2019]. GlasgowAirport
(9.6 million) would fall just below the threshold.
56See NATS, “Facts, Stats, and Reports”, https://www.nats.aero/news/facts-stats-reports/; DFS Press Release,
“DFSGroup takes over air traffic control in Edinburgh” (29March 2018), https://www.dfs.de/dfs_homepage/en/Press
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airlines EasyJet (68 million passengers) and British Airways (42 million) would be covered,57 as—most
likely—would Ryanair, which reportedly provides around one-fifth of flights departing from the UK.58
Safeguarding obligations
Under the NIS Directive, Member States must ensure that OES take “appropriate and proportionate
technical and organisational measures” with regard to the security of the network and information systems
they use in the provision of their services. OES must:
(i) manage the risks posed to those systems;
(ii) prevent andminimise the impact of incidents affecting those systems, with a view to ensuring
the continuity of their services; and
(iii) have regard to the state of the art and ensure a level of security appropriate to the risk posed.59
The requirement to implement “appropriate and proportionate measures” can be viewed as an example
of principles-basedmeta-regulation. It is principles-based, in that the Directive sets out high-level objectives
and values, while OES are left free to devise their own systems to implement the principles in practice.60
It is meta-regulation in that it requires OES to develop their own internal, self-regulatory responses to a
public problem.61 The aim is to stimulate self-critical evaluation and self-organisation within companies,
who then report to regulators on the strategy they have put in place.62
Given the similarities between the definition of ECI and OES, some operators in the energy and transport
sectors may qualify as both, namely if their services impact on multiple Member States. As a result, they
would be subject to two concurrent EU Directives with respect to the security of their critical service.
Under the ECI Directive, eachMember State shall identify operators of ECI on its territory, after discussion
with other Member States that may be impacted by disruption. It is difficult for outsiders to determine
which operators may be subject to both Directives, since under the ECI Directive, information concerning
the designation as ECI shall be classified.63 Fortunately, the main requirements under the two Directives
are overlapping and/or complementary, rather than contradictory. At first glance, this principles-based
approach differs from the more prescriptive obligations established under the ECI Directive, which require
operators of ECI to have an operator security plan (OSP) in place and appoint a Security Liaison Officer
(SLO) to function as a point of contact with the relevant Member State authority.64 However, the ECI
Directive describes an OSP as being similar to what is required under the NIS Directive’s safeguarding
obligations, namely as a plan that: (i) identifies important assets; (ii) conducts a risk analysis; and (iii)
identifies and selects counter-measures.65 The main difference in terms of safeguarding obligations thus
appears to be that the ECI Directive requires operators to appoint a SLO. The European Commission has
/Press%20releases/2018/29.03.2018.-%20DFS%20Group%20takes%20over%20air%20traffic%20control%20in
%20Edinburgh/ [Both accessed 16 December 2019].
57CAA, “Airline data annual reports 2017”, https://www.caa.co.uk/Data-and-analysis/UK-aviation-market/Airlines
/Datasets/UK-Airline-data/2017/Airline-data-annual-reports-2017/ [Accessed 16 December 2019].
58O. Smith, “How Ryanair is taking over Europe, one country at a time”, The Telegraph (28 March 2018), https:/
/www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/news/how-ryanair-is-taking-over-the-world/ [Accessed 16 December 2019].
59NIS Directive art.14(1)–(2); NIS Regulations r.10(1).
60Baldwin, Cave and Lodge, Understanding Regulation (2012), p.302.
61C. Coglianese and E. Mendelson, “Meta-regulation and Self-regulation” in Oxford Handbook of Regulation
(2010), p.150.
62N. Gunningham, “Enforcement and Compliance Strategies” in Oxford Handbook of Regulation (2010), p.135.
63ECI Directive art.4(5). The requirement that a company’s designation as an ECI operator be treated as confidential
information seems to adopt a security-by-obscurity approach.
64ECI Directive arts 5–6.
65ECI Directive art.5, Annex II.
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launched an evaluation of the ECI Directive, with a report expected in 2019.66 The European Commission
should clarify the relationship between the ECI Directive and the NIS Directive in its 2019 report, so as
to reduce unnecessary uncertainty around the overlap of the two Directives.
Further, multiple Member States can have jurisdiction over the same operator under the NIS Directive,
if it has branch offices in several Member States.67 For instance, Ryanair, headquartered in Ireland, is
reportedly the biggest airline in seven EU countries and the second biggest in five more.68 In such cases,
Member States are required to consult each other when identifying the same operator as an OES.69
Since the approaches taken in national legislation or by national regulators may differ, there is a risk
that companies designated as OES in multiple Member States may need to comply with different legal
requirements. This could potentially result in serious complications for OES providing transnational
services. For example, Ryanair could face one set of regulations when taking off from Spain, and another
when landing in the UK. Admittedly, concurrent national competencies should be a familiar issue for air
transport regulators and airlines, since air transport is often inherently international. National regulators
need to work together to avoid clashes in how the NIS Directive is implemented and interpreted, for
instance through the Cooperation Group established under the NIS Directive.70 To some extent, authorities
should already be co-operating under the ECI Directive with regard to OES who are also designated as
ECI.
Information obligations
The NIS Directive imposes two types of information obligations on companies. The first is reactive: OES
must comply with requests from regulators to provide any information necessary to assess the security of
their systems, including documented security policies, and to provide evidence of the effective
implementation of such policies, including the results of a security audit.71 The UK Government has
assigned competent authorities by sector to regulate OES, so they can apply sector-specific knowledge
and expertise.72 The Government envisages that regulators will use this power to request information to
engage in a pro-active and cooperative process of cybersecurity oversight. Regulators and OES should
work together to manage risks, assess threats, and agree countermeasures.73
The second is pro-active: OES must notify the relevant authority of security incidents without undue
delay, and under the NIS Regulation, “no later than 72 hours” after they become aware of an incident.74
In the UK, OES notify their competent sector authority, who in turn informs the national computer security
incident response team (CSIRT) as soon as reasonably practicable.75 CSIRTs monitor and respond to
incidents and provide early warnings to stakeholders about risks.76 The UK Government has designated
the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) of the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ)
66Commission, “Evaluation of the 2008 European Critical Infrastructure Protection Directive” (2018), https://ec
.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/initiatives/ares-2018-1378074_en [Accessed 16 December 2018].
67Commission, “Making the most of NIS” (2017), p.24.
68Smith, “How Ryanair is taking over Europe, one country at a time”, The Telegraph (28 March 2018).
69NIS Directive art.5(4); CG Publication 07/2018, “Identification of Operators of Essential Services” (2018).
70NIS Directive art.1(2)(b).
71NIS Directive art.15(2); NIS Regulations r.15.
72UKDepartment for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS), “Security of Network and Information Systems”,
Public Consultation (2017) p.12.
73DCMS, “Security of Network and Information Systems” (2017), p.12; Department for Transport (DfT),
“Guidance—Implementation of the NIS Directive” (2018), p.19.
74NIS Directive art.14(3); NIS Regulations r.11. There is no equivalent obligation under the ECI Directive.
75NIS Directive art.10(3); NIS Regulations r.11(5)(b).
76Commission, “Making the most of NIS” (2017), p.17.
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as the CSIRT.77 CSIRTs also share information on incidents internationally: when alerted to an incident
that will significantly impact on the continuity of an essential service in another Member State, the CSIRT
must inform thatMember State.78Below, we consider whether these information obligations will adequately
reduce the risk of insufficient information sharing identified above.
Finally, in addition to the above disclosure and notification obligations, which are mandatory and
hierarchical (i.e. one-way), the NIS Directive also contains provisions regarding information sharing by
Member States directly, which tend to be voluntary and communitarian (i.e. two-way). For instance, the
NIS Directive sets up a Cooperation Group whereMember States, the European Agency for Cybersecurity,
and the Commission can exchange best practices and share experiences, and a network for CSIRTs to
exchange information on incidents and associated risks.79
Will the NIS Directive requirements improve the cybersecurity of CNI?
Safeguarding obligations
On the one hand, risk management obligations are arguably inherent to cybersecurity, since, short of
complete isolation, there can be no absolute security in networked information systems. As a result,
cybersecurity by nature entails risk management.80 Principles-based regulation appears equally well suited
to cybersecurity. It differs from rules-based regulation, where policy-makers mandate that companies put
in place specific security measures.81 Since each organisation’s IT architecture presents a unique
cybersecurity challenge, even a well-informed policy-maker would not be able to determine which assets
should be subject to which security requirements in the abstract.82 Principles-based meta-regulation leaves
companies free to put in place company-specific measures, based on their understanding of their own
operations and IT architecture. Principles-based regulation tends to be more appropriate when problems
are highly complex and there are no one-size-fits-all solutions, as with cybersecurity.83
Principles-based regulation also suits the dynamic nature of cybersecurity as both threats and
vulnerabilities are in a constant state of flux. Changing weather patterns can give rise to unexpected storms
that threaten the physical security of data centres, while political events can give rise to newly motivated
threat agents. Further, the complexity of modern systems means there are likely to be many unknown
vulnerabilities: the more complex an IT system is, the more bugs it is likely to contain.84New vulnerabilities
are regularly reported in academic papers or dedicated online repositories.85Once a vulnerability is known,
a vendor will generally try to release a “patch”: a software update that removes the vulnerability.86 A
so-called “zero-day exploit” is a tool, code or action that uses an unknown—and so
77NIS Regulations rr.4–5. GCHQ is an intelligence and security organisation that provides signals intelligence and
information assurance to the Government and armed forces.
78NIS Directive art.14(5).
79NIS Directive arts 11–12.
80B. Schneier, Schneier on Security (Indianapolis, IN: Wiley Publishing Inc, 2008), Introduction.
81F. Massacci, R. Ruprai, M. Collinson and J. Williams, “Economic Impacts of Rules- versus Risk- Based
Cybersecurity Regulations for Critical Infrastructure Providers” (2016) 14 IEEE Security & Privacy 53.
82Massacci et al., “Economic Impacts of Rules- versus Risk- Based Cybersecurity Regulations for Critical
Infrastructure Providers” (2016) 14 IEEE Security & Privacy 53, 59.
83Coglianese and Mendelson, “Meta-regulation and Self-regulation” in Oxford Handbook of Regulation (2010),
pp.152, 163.
84Cavelty, “25: Cyber-security” in Contemporary Security Studies (2012), p.4.
85E.g. “Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures”, https://cve.mitre.org/ [Accessed 16 December 2019].
86Assuming the vendor still supports the software.
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unpatched—vulnerability. It should work on all “unpatched” instances of a software program.87 Thus,
cybersecurity involves an ongoing game of cat-and-mouse between attackers seeking fresh exploits,
software vendors issuing patches, and users “patching” their systems. Under principles-based regulation,
companies can implement new measures quickly, since there is no need to await a regulator’s or industry
group’s agreement.88
However, principles-based regulation under the NIS Directive faces several key challenges. First, it is
difficult for even well-informed and well-intentioned OES to conduct effective cyber risk management,
which inherently involves an element of subjective judgment. Regulators should accordingly accord them
significant discretion. However, some operators may fail to use their discretion in the public interest,
instead pursuing their own private interests while trying to project an appearance of compliance. The need
to accord companies a level of discretion then complicates enforcement, by making it difficult to prove
non-compliance. We develop these points in turn below.
Cyber risk management involves discretion in dealing with uncertainty
The NIS Directive defines a risk as “any reasonably identifiable circumstance or event having a potential
adverse effect on the security of network and information systems”.89 OES are obliged to put in place
“appropriate and proportionate” security measures to manage risks and provide a level of security
appropriate to the risk posed.90 In effect, this requires OES to engage in risk management: the ongoing
process of identifying, assessing, and responding to risk.91 In computer science, a “vulnerability” is a
property of a system that creates the potential for a breach of one or more of the CIA objectives.92 A
“threat” refers to a set of circumstances that may allow a vulnerability to be exploited.93 Thus, a risk occurs
when a threat and a corresponding vulnerability exist, or: risk = vulnerability + threat.94 The level of risk
is determined by the likelihood of the risk materialising into an event and the severity of the possible
impact of such an event. Risk is conventionally measured as the probability of an event occurring x the
impact of that event.95 In relation to cyber risks, the level of risk is: the probability that a vulnerability will
be exploited or lead to failure x the expected damage if this occurs, or: level of risk = (threat + vulnerability)
x damage. Further, the requirement to put in place “appropriate” measures means that the measures must
effectively address the risk. The reference to proportionality suggests the costs of the security measures
should be in proportion to the risk.96 The Directive aims to avoid imposing disproportionate financial or
administrative burdens on the regulated entities.97 This suggests that OES should engage in a cost-benefit
risk analysis.98 In theory, such cost-benefit risk analyses should drive OES to invest in those measures
87US Government, “Vulnerabilities Equities Policy and Process” (2017), p.11; UK GCHQ, “The Equities Process”
(2018).
88Baldwin, Cave and Lodge, Understanding Regulation (2012), p.147; DfT, “Guidance—Implementation of the
NIS Directive” (2018), p.19.
89NIS Directive art.4(9); NIS Regulations r.1(1), (3).
90NIS Directive art.14; NIS Regulations rr.10, 12.
91See National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), “NIST Framework for improving critical infrastructure
cybersecurity v. 1.1” (2018), p.4.
92R. Anderson, Security Engineering, 2nd edn (Indianapolis, IN: Wiley Publishing Inc, 2018), p.15.
93Cavelty, “25: Cyber-security” in Contemporary Security Studies (2012), p.5.
94ENISA, “Cloud Computing Benefits, risks and recommendations for information security” (2012), p.13.
95 J. Black: “The Role of Risk in Regulatory Processes” in Oxford Handbook of Regulation (2010), p.310.
96NIS Cooperation Group, “Reference Document on security measures for Operators of Essential Services”, CG
Publication 01/2018, p.9.
97NIS Directive, Recital 58.
98Baldwin, Cave and Lodge, Understanding Regulation (2012), p.310; NIS Cooperation Group, “Reference
Document on security measures for Operators of Essential Services” (2018), p.10.
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which effectively reduce risks to society to an “efficient” level.99 Thus, under the NIS Directive, an OES
should implement a certain measure if: the cost of measure < the probability of a threat exploiting a
vulnerability x the expected damage.
There is no settled scientific risk assessment method.100 The NCSC provides a guide for choosing a
suitable riskmanagement approach for UKOES, but does not mandate amethodology.101A riskmanagement
process typically involves three key steps.
Step 1: Identifying cyber risks To identify risks, an OES first needs to draw up a list of the systems it
uses to provide its essential services, which we will refer to as “critical systems”.102 These are the systems
it needs to protect under the NIS Directive. The UK Department for Transport (DfT) considers that the
critical systems for the air transport sector are those that enable aircraft to land and take-off and passengers
to depart and arrive. This includes check-in facilities, departure control, security checks, air navigation,
and aircraft operation.103 Other systems, such as those used for the provision of shopping areas at airports,
would only be covered to the extent they are relevant to the security of critical systems.104
The OES should then identify cyber risks to its critical systems. To do so, it can look for known
vulnerabilities in critical systems. In the air transport sector, some aviation-specific software will have
been rigorously tested during its design so as to ensure a low risk of faults under aviation safety regulation.105
For example, the United States Federal Aviation Authority reportedly assesses the content of software
and updates to analyse safety implications beforehand.106 Yet, following the crashes of two Boeing 737
Max airplanes in 2018 and 2019, some have questioned the efficacy of such testing, in particular when
the regulator delegates performance of some of the tests to the manufacturer’s staff.107 Ultimately, even
with prior testing, all software will inevitably contain some faults.108 To identify vulnerabilities, OESmight
need to engage external experts, for instance to conduct a penetration test (or “pen test”) on its systems,
wherein an outsider attempts to breach the security of a system using the same tools and techniques an
attacker might.109OES also need to identify the threats that could impact the identified vulnerabilities. The
NCSC recommends that OES have a “good understanding of the threat landscape” in order to effectively
identify risks.110
Step 2: Assessing cyber risks Once an OES has identified relevant cyber risks, it needs to determine
which present the highest risk, as measured by the probability of a threat exploiting a vulnerability and
the expected damage. In relation to impact, OES also need to consider any mitigating measures already
99As discussed below, this may require placing a monetary value on human safety, which is difficult and highly
contentious.
100Black, “The Role of Risk in Regulatory Processes” in Oxford Handbook of Regulation (2010), p.315.
101NCSC, NIS Directive Guidance, “Summary of risk methods and frameworks” (2016).
102NIS Directive art.14; DfT, “Guidance—Implementation of the NIS Directive” (2018), p.17.
103DfT, “Guidance—Implementation of the NIS Directive” (2018), p.17.
104See NIS Directive, Recital 22.
105 Independent Enquiry Panel, NATS System Failure 12 December 2014—Final Report (2015), pp.5–6.
106A. Smith, “Franken-algorithms: the deadly consequences of unpredictable code” (30 August 2018), The Guardian,
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/aug/29/coding-algorithms-frankenalgos-program-danger?CMP=twt
_gu [Accessed 16 December 2019].
107E.g. D. Gates, “Flawed analysis, failed oversight: How Boeing, FAA certified the suspect 737MAX flight control
system” (17March 2019) Seattle Times, https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/failed-certification
-faa-missed-safety-issues-in-the-737-max-system-implicated-in-the-lion-air-crash/ [Accessed 16 December 2019].
108See NATS Enquiry (2015), pp.5–6.
109NCSC, “Penetration Testing”, https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/guidance/penetration-testing [Accessed 16 December
2019].
110NCSC, “NIS Directive Guidance”,A2. Risk management, https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/guidance/a2-risk-management
[Accessed 16 December 2019].
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in place, so as to establish the “net” or “residual” risk to each system. OES may already have in place
back-up systems to turn to in case of failure (known as “failover”). For instance, if an airline’s electronic
boarding passes system fails, it can failover to paper boarding passes. Similarly, pilots fly with paper
navigation charts and flight plans and have back-up instruments on their cockpit displays, in case digital
charts or instruments fail.111
Step 3: Responding to cyber risks Once an OES has assessed the relevant risks, it must decide how to
respond. In general, it can:
• accept the residual risk as falling within its risk tolerance;
• reduce the risk:
either by reducing the likelihood of a threat successfully exploiting a vulnerability (e.g. by
improving preventative counter-measures), or by mitigating the resulting damage (e.g. by
improving failover options); or
• avoid the risk:
by stopping the activity that is causing the risk.112
While the above steps sound reasonable in principle, they present significant challenges in practice. It is
difficult to identify vulnerabilities in complex systems.
In addition, it is difficult to assess the level of risk posed by each specific vulnerability, since threats
can come from a wide range of sources, both intentional or unintentional, as well as internal and external.113
Moreover, human threat agents vary in terms of their purpose and level of organisation, expertise and
resources, ranging from well-funded foreign state security services to disgruntled former employees and
hacker-hobbyists.
Secondly, while some risks may be quantifiable by extrapolating from statistics regarding the frequency
of past events,114 e.g. the likelihood of a storm of a certain severity, other risks are inherently uncertain
and are not susceptible to quantitative assessment.115 For example, the likelihood of a terrorist cyber-attack
does not lend itself to a statistical analysis. Instead, it is, as Rumsfeld put it, “a known unknown”.116
Compilation reports on the prevalence of certain types of cyber-attacks can indicate their likelihood. For
example, the Verizon 2018 Data Breach Investigations Report noted that over half of the breaches in 2018
featured hacking and a third included malware, while over three-quarters of breaches were financially
motivated, with half being carried out by organised criminal groups.117 Nonetheless, a great deal of risk
analysis is ultimately concerned with trying to turn such uncertainties into probabilities.118Given the above,
any cost-benefit risk analysis will inevitably be mired in uncertainty.
111R. Charles, “Op-Ed: Why hacking an airliner isn’t just an app away” (16 April 2014), RunwayGirlNetwork,
https://runwaygirlnetwork.com/2014/04/16/oped-why-hacking-an-airliner-isnt-just-an-app-away/ [Accessed 16
December 2019].
112NIST, “NIST Framework for improving critical infrastructure cybersecurity v. 1.1” (2018), p.4.
113Cavelty, “25: Cyber-security” in Contemporary Security Studies (2012), p.4.
114Baldwin, Cave and Lodge, Understanding Regulation (2012), pp.86–88.
115Baldwin, Cave, and Lodge, Understanding Regulation (2012), p.310; Black, “The Role of Risk in Regulatory
Processes” in Oxford Handbook of Regulation (2010), p.310.
116US Department of Defense, “News Briefing—Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers” (12 February 2002),
http://archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=2636 [Accessed 16 December 2019].
117Verizon, 2018 Data Breach Investigations Report (2017), p.5, https://www.verizonenterprise.com/resources
/reports/2017_dbir_en_xg.pdf [Accessed 16 December 2019].
118Black, “The Role of Risk in Regulatory Processes” in Oxford Handbook of Regulation (2010), p.314.
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Cyber risk management is inherently subjective
Deciding how to respond to a risk entails difficult trade-offs and a level of subjective assessment. There
is no objective way to determine how safe is safe enough.119 The NIS Directive defines security as the
ability to resist actions that compromise CIA and authenticity “at a given level of confidence”. It does not
further define that level of confidence. To counteract the risk of under-investment identified previously,
OES should put in place measures appropriate to the risk posed to society by disruption of their services.
However, assessing and then valuing the relevant “externalities”, i.e. the damage to society to be avoided
from possible security breaches, is not straightforward. OES will need to consider at least the expected
economic harm to others from any disruption of their service, but will also need to consider public safety.
Quantifying the likelihood that a security breach would lead to harm, and then the likely extent of such
harm, is difficult, since it depends on a range of factors, including the intentions of a potential attacker
and any mitigation measures already taken by affected third parties. Moreover, to compare like-for-like
in a strict cost-benefit risk analysis, an OES would also need to attach a monetary value to the potential
costs of a service disruption. Thus, an airline would need to determine the “value” to society of passenger
time wasted from cancelled flights. This is likely a contentious issue, with no objective answer. Deciding
the monetary value of “public safety” and of injuries to be avoided or lives to be saved would be even
more difficult.
The wording of the NIS Directive adds to this uncertainty, owing to a lack of clarity around which risks
OES should manage. The NIS Directive focuses on services that are “essential for the maintenance of
critical societal and economic activities” and explicitly requires OES to take measures to ensure service
continuity.120 This indicates that OES should focus on the risk of disrupting wider societal and economic
activities and causing economic harm. However, it is less clear whether OES should also focus onmanaging
risks that relate to the safety of persons. This is in contrast to the ECI Directive, which defines “critical
infrastructure” as being essential to a range of functions, including “health”, “safety” and “security”, and
identifies ECI in part based on a “casualties” criterion.121
There are several indications that the NIS Directive was also intended to capture such risks. First, it
mentions public safety as one of the factors to take into account when determining a “significant disruptive
effect”, in the context of identifying OES.122 Secondly, the European Commission’s thresholds for incident
reporting by DSPs mention creating “a risk to public safety, security, or loss of life” as an independent
factor.123 Thirdly, the UK Government’s stated approach to penalties under the NIS Directive provides
that “an immediate threat to life” is an important factor in determining the size of fines.124 Finally, including
risks to safety would accord with the UK’s definition of CNI, which covers “those services whose integrity,
if compromised, could result in significant loss of life or casualties”.125 Nonetheless, the NIS Directive is
not explicit on this point, leaving it unclear whether OES should seek to manage risks that involve a
physical threat to persons, without leading to widespread service outages. Regulators need to provide
guidance on this point.
119Black, “The Role of Risk in Regulatory Processes” in Oxford Handbook of Regulation (2010), p.321.
120NIS Directive art.14(2).
121ECI Directive arts 2(a), 3(2)(a).
122NIS Directive, Recital 27 art.6(1)(c).
123Commission Implementing Regulation 2018/151 [2015] OJ L38 art.4.
124NIS Regulations r.18(6).
125UK Centre for Protection of National Infrastructure, “Critical national infrastructure”, https://www.cpni.gov.uk
/critical-national-infrastructure-0 [Accessed 16 December 2019].
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OES should be accorded a level of discretion
In light of the above, any quantitative cyber cost-benefit risk analysis inherently involves an amount of
“educated guesswork”, subjective judgements, and difficult trade-offs. When it comes to assessing
uncertainties and weighing proportionate responses, there are no objectively right and wrong answers. At
most, a cost-benefit risk analysis may help OES rationalise and prioritise their cybersecurity investments.126
Such analysis should, at least, point to “obvious” cases, such as where a low-cost measure can reduce a
high-likelihood, high-impact risk.
As a result, regulators should arguably give OES a significant measure of discretion under the NIS
Directive. As long as an OES follows a defined risk management process, analyses relevant information,
and makes a good-faith determination on how to respond, then it will seemingly have complied with the
NIS Directive. In this respect, the requirements are more about process than exact outcomes.
Thus, not every security breach—no matter how disruptive—should constitute a breach of the NIS
Directive. Provided an OES has conducted a thorough risk management process, it will have discharged
its duty. If it subsequently experiences a security breach despite its best efforts, this would not constitute
a breach of the NIS Directive. Conversely, an OES could be in breach of its legal requirements, even
without a disruptive security breach, if it has failed to undertake diligent efforts to identify risks to its
systems. For example, if it has failed to perform a thorough assessment of the risks it faces based on the
best available information; or to respond to those risks in an appropriate and proportionate manner. For
example, running old, unpatched versions of software on critical systems could indicate a failure to identify
obvious risks—if the OES was unaware—or to respond adequately if the OES identified the vulnerability,
but failed to take appropriate action within a reasonable time.
OES may abuse their discretion
With principles-based meta-regulation, the regulator operates at a distance: it relies on companies to put
in place appropriate systems and acts only to ensure that these mechanisms are working effectively.127
Companies should in the first instance translate high-level principles into practice. Doing so typically
involves a good deal of judgement.128 Given the extent of discretion in interpreting principles-based
meta-regulation, it can be difficult to determine definitively that the regulation has been breached. This
highlights a primary problem with principles-based meta-regulation: although companies have better
access to information about their own cybersecurity, they do not necessary have the right incentives to
use that information to further the public interest. Thus, the challenge is to ensure that companies use the
discretion they are granted under meta-regulation in ways consistent with the regulation’s objectives,
rather than their own private interests.129
In the context of the NIS Directive, this refers to OES fully considering the wider damages to society
from the possible disruption of their services as part of their cyber risk management, not only the damages
to their own commercial interests (to the extent that they diverge). In theory, the NIS Directive should
drive OES to internalise negative externalities, so as to reduce address the risk of under-investment, as
set out above. However, in practice, companies differ both in terms of their ability and their motivation
to comply. While low-capability companies lack the required information or expertise to implement
appropriate measures; ill-intentioned companies will simply not be inclined to do so. Indeed, an
ill-intentioned company may take a risk-based approach to compliance: weighing up the benefit of
126See Black, “The Role of Risk in Regulatory Processes” in Oxford Handbook of Regulation, (2010), p.322.
127Gunningham, “Enforcement and Compliance Strategies” in Oxford Handbook of Regulation (2010), p.135.
128Baldwin, Cave and Lodge, Understanding Regulation (2012), p.304.
129Coglianese and Mendelson, “Meta-regulation and Self-regulation” in Oxford Handbook of Regulation (2010),
p.153.
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non-compliance in terms of business opportunities against the cost of potential sanctions. This could lead
the company to approach compliance as a periodic negotiation with the regulator and only put in place
those measures the regulator requests to review.130 Wherever possible, the company will translate the
high-level principles into practices that accord with its own objectives, mainly of pursuing profits.131 As
a result, it may pursue an approach of “paper compliance” with the NIS Directive,132while avoiding having
to invest in costly cybersecurity measures. This may even enable them to undercut more-compliant
competitors.
The problem is that since regulators should accord OES a level of discretion under the NIS Directive,
it is difficult to assess which companies are really investing in improved security, and which are merely
engaging in security window-dressing. For example, an OES may report that it is training its staff on best
practices for countering social engineering and phishing attacks. How can a regulator assess whether that
training is in fact being implemented across the organisation, and if so, whether the training will effectively
prevent staff from clicking on links in phishing emails? Similarly, it is difficult for a regulator to assess
whether a patch management plan is deployed consistently across a company.
Unlike the Data Protection Officer (DPO) requirement under the GDPR, the NIS Directive does not
require OES to appoint an independent security officer with sufficient resources to monitor and advise on
compliance.133 The DPO function effectively internalises an element of independent supervision within
companies to provide a first level of regulatory scrutiny.When effective, this can help reduce the regulator’s
burden, although traditional concerns around “regulatory capture” of the DPO remain.134 Further, while
the ECI Directive does require operators of ECI to appoint an SLO, it does not require the SLO to be
independent or have sufficient resources. Instead, the SLO’s task under the ECI Directive relates primarily
to exchanging relevant information concerning identified risks and threats withMember State authorities.135
As a result, there is no requirement for an independent, internal expert to challenge an OES’s decisions
on security.
In addition, unlike the accountability principle under the GDPR, there is no explicit requirement under
the NIS Directive for companies to pro-actively demonstrate their compliance on an ongoing basis.136 Nor
does the NIS Directive require an OES to have a documented operator security plan in place, in contrast
to the ECI Directive.137 While these reduced documentary requirements may mitigate against “paper
compliance” by regulatees, it may also encourage some companies to take a reactive approach and focus
their compliance programmes on responding to requests from regulators.138 To some extent, regulators
can try to counter “paper compliance” approaches by appointing or requiring companies to appoint external
security experts to conduct pen tests on certain systems. Under the NIS Regulations, a regulator can
conduct an inspection of an OES itself, or appoint a person to conduct an inspection on its behalf.139
However, pen tests only provide a partial answer. They identify vulnerabilities open to potential deliberate
threats, but would not necessarily identify those subject to accidental threats. Moreover, a pen test is only
as effective as the pen tester and the test case library they deploy.140 Finally, a pen test is a point-in-time
130Baldwin, Cave and Lodge, Understanding Regulation (2012), pp.150–153.
131Baldwin, Cave, and Lodge, Understanding Regulation (2012), p.309.
132Gunningham, “Enforcement and Compliance Strategies” in Oxford Handbook of Regulation (2010), p.138.
133Cf. GDPR arts 38–39.
134See C. Quelle, “Privacy, Proceduralism and Self-Regulation in Data Protection Law” (2017) 1 Teoria Critica
della Regolazione Sociale 105.
135ECI Directive art.6(4).
136Cf. GDPR art.5(2).
137ECI Directive arts 5–6.
138Baldwin, Cave and Lodge, Understanding Regulation (2012), pp.150–153.
139NIS Regulations r.16.
140R. Savola, “On the Feasibility of Utilizing SecurityMetrics in Software-Intensive Systems” (2010) 10 I.J.C.S.N.S.
232.
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assessment. It does not measure an organisation’s ability to maintain or monitor its systems over time.
Moreover, such tests are likely too costly to be held regularly on large numbers of systems. As a result,
“paper compliance” may not be unveiled until it is too late: namely, when an incident reveals a structural
weakness in an OES’s security.
Information obligations
Will the information obligations under the NISDirective help regulatorsmonitor and assess OES compliance
and reduce the “paper compliance” risk we have identified? Taken together, the obligations to provide
regulators with information on request and to notify regulators of incidents, serve to reduce the risk of
information being held in silos. The regulator should be in a position to collect relevant information from
across a sector and review OES’ strategies side-by-side. It can use this information to establish industry
benchmarks, identify best practices, and promote their wider adoption, as well as to spot gaps in a particular
OES’s strategy. Further, the detection of relevant incidents is key to understanding companies’ level of
compliance and the effectiveness of the regime.141 Regulators can use information regarding specific
incidents to update their understanding of the risks a sector faces, amend their guidelines, and inform their
enforcement strategy. Ideally, a regulator will be able to obtain sufficient information from the companies
in its sector to determine each company’s ability and motivation to comply. It can then tailor and target
its responses accordingly.142 The competent authority or CSIRT can provide an OES with information
relating to the incident, in order to assist them in dealing with that incident more effectively or to prevent
future incidents.143 In this manner, UK OES can benefit from the NCSC’s expertise when they report an
incident. In addition, the regulator can alert other companies across sectors to a vulnerability or an emerging
threat.144
However, there are limits to this approach. First, sectoral regulators need a solid understanding of
cybersecurity in order to know what information to request from OES and how to assess it. In the UK,
the Secretary of State for Transport (DfT) and the CAA are the competent authority designated for OES
in the air transport sub-sector.145 While cybersecurity is not a completely new issue for the air transport
sector, it is a new area of competence for the CAA, requiring it to obtain the necessary in-house expertise
and recast its approach to risk assessment, focusing on security rather than safety.146
Secondly, the incident notification requirements may be too narrowly drafted to cover all relevant
incidents. The NIS Directive defines an “incident” as any event having an actual adverse effect on the
security of network and information systems,147 meaning on the CIA or authenticity of data or related
services.148 Not every incident that breaches CIA or authenticity will qualify as a “significant” incident
requiring notification. Instead, the obligation for OES to notify applies to incidents that have a significant
impact on the continuity of their essential services.149 Significance should be determined based on the
number of users affected by the disruption; the duration; and the geographic area affected.150 In the air
transport sector, the DfT has set as a threshold for notification a single incident that, within a 24-hour
period, results in:
141Baldwin, Cave and Lodge, Understanding Regulation (2012), p.272.
142Baldwin, Cave and Lodge, Understanding Regulation (2012), p.262.
143NIS Regulations r.11(7).
144See R. Anderson, R. Böhme, R. Clayton and T. Moore, “Security Economics and European Policy”, ISSE 2008
Securing Electronic Business Processes (2009), pp.77–80.
145NIS Regulations r.3(1) and Sch.1.
146 Interview with the CAA, notes on file with the authors, 27 October 2017.
147NIS Directive art.4(7).
148Commission, “Making the most of NIS” (2017), p.31.
149NIS Directive art.14(3); NIS Regulations r.11(1).
150NIS Directive art.14(4); NIS Regulations r.11(2).
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• for major airports:
more than 20 per cent of scheduled flights being cancelled;
• for ATC providers:
more than 10,000 unscheduled, en-route delay minutes;
• for airlines:
more than 30 per cent of the scheduled flights across the UK being cancelled.151
Setting specific metrics for notification thresholds provides legal certainty. However, the metrics may be
too narrow in two respects. First, notification is required only for security breaches that disrupt an essential
or digital service. This reflects the Directive’s aim to ensure CNI continuity. Yet there can be far-reaching
security breaches of OES systems that do not lead to significant disruption. For instance, an attacker could
gain unauthorised access to the system and obtain root privileges, without causing mass disruption. For
example, a security researcher reportedly told the FBI that he had hacked into aircrafts’ in-flight networks
more than a dozen times in the period 2011 to 2014, through the in-flight entertainment system. To do so,
he connected his laptop to the seat electronic box and used default IDs and passwords to gain access to
the aircraft’s systems, including the thrust control systems.152While this incident indicated serious security
vulnerabilities, it did not lead to any delays and so would not trigger a notification requirement. Similarly,
if an OES suffered a ransomware attack, but paid the ransom before it caused any disruption to its service,
this would not trigger a notification requirement. As a result, regulators may need to regularly ask OES
for information about non-notifiable breaches, in order to identify emerging security trends.
Further, there could be widespread breaches of confidentiality which do not (directly) affect the continuity
of services. For example, on 6 September 2018, British Airways announced that it had suffered a breach
of the names, email addresses, and credit card information of around 380,000 customers.153 Subsequent
reports indicated that the attackers had access to British Airways servers, since they were able to modify
the website’s code.154Although this incident looked like a serious security breach, it did not result in delays
or cancellations of flights. Such incidents might highlight significant vulnerabilities in an OES’ security,
but would not trigger a notification obligation.155 As a result, regulators may not be notified of important
vulnerabilities and will not be able to warn other operators. Nonetheless, in cases involving personal data,
such breaches would be subject to a notification requirement under the GDPR. British Airways notified
the 2018 breach to the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO), which has opened an investigation.156
Thus, NIS Directive authorities may need to regularly liaise with national data protection authorities to
identify emerging security trends.
Secondly, notification thresholds may fail to capture all relevant risks. For example, the DfT’s thresholds
for air transport OES do not require notification for incidents that create a risk to public safety, security,
151DfT, “Guidance—Implementation of the NIS Directive” (2018), Annex E, p.44.
152K. Zetter, “Feds Say that Banned Researcher Commandeered a Plane” (2015), Wired, https://www.wired.com
/2015/05/feds-say-banned-researcher-commandeered-plane/ [Accessed 16 December 2019].
153British Airways, “Customer Data Theft” (2018), https://www.britishairways.com/en-gb/information/incident
/data-theft/latest-information [Accessed 16 December 2019].
154RISKIQ, “Inside the Magecart Breach of British Airways: How 22 Lines of Code Claimed 380,000 Victims”
(11 September 2018), https://www.riskiq.com/blog/labs/magecart-british-airways-breach/ [Accessed 16 December
2019].
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or loss of life. As a result, if a security breach were to endanger the passengers and crew, but not result
in mass delays, it would not trigger a notification requirement under the DfT’s NIS Directive thresholds.
This may, in part, stem from the lack of clarity around which risks OES should manage under the NIS
Directive, as discussed above. In theory, this suggests that incidents like the two Boeing 737 Max crashes
would only be notified to the UK regulator if they caused further service disruption. Regulators need to
clarify this important point, or risk missing information on safety-related incidents.
How should regulators enforce the NIS Directive?
Guidance and collaboration
To counteract the challenges of uncertainty under the NIS Directive identified above, regulators can issue
guidance on how to interpret and implement the Directive. For example, the NIS Cooperation Group has
published a series of guidelines and reference documents under the NIS Directive.157 In the UK, the NCSC
has set out high level security principles, which are complemented by sector-specific guidelines from
competent authorities.158 It has also developed a framework for OES to perform a cybersecurity
self-assessment, with a list of indicators of “good practice”.159 Sectoral regulators have also prepared and
published guidance on NIS implementation.160 The CAA has developed an air-transport-sector-specific
cyber assessment framework known as “CAP 1574”, with a self-assessment tool, known as the “CAF”.161
CAP1574 sets out 26 security controls as a framework for managing cyber risks in aviation. It references
international standards, such as ISO and NIST standards as examples.162 The framework aims at supporting
both safety requirements and economic resilience.163
Admittedly, the more detailed guidance regulators provide, the more a principles-based regime begins
to resemble rules-based regulation.164 Nonetheless, OES remain free to adopt alternate methods of
demonstrating compliance. For example, under the NIS Directive, an OES can seek to comply by following
European Agency for Cybersecurity guidance and industry standards strictly, or by achieving an equivalent
level of cybersecurity using alternate measures. In addition, regulators canmore easily adjust their guidance
to reflect new technological developments, than legislators can re-write prescriptive rules.165
Monitoring compliance
To counteract the risk of OES engaging in mere “paper compliance”, regulators must take a pro-active
approach to monitoring OES’ security practices. Regulators need to actively challenge companies to
demonstrate that their systems work in practice, scrutinise their measures, and judge if the company has
the leadership, staff, systems, and procedures in place to meet its obligations.166 For example, the CAA
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159NCSC, “NIS Directive—Cyber Assessment Framework”, https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/guidance/indicators-good
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has stated that it requested each OES in the air transport sub-sector to perform a self-assessment by the
end of 2018. The CAA will then discuss the results with each OES and determine any necessary
improvements. If required, the CAAmay instruct the OES to appoint an independent third party to conduct
audits or testing.167
Nonetheless, active engagement and scrutiny are resource-intensive and security experts are a finite
resource. This raises the question: how should regulators direct their resources to monitor and challenge
OES? One answer would be for regulators to adopt a risk-based approach to enforcement: focusing their
efforts on those companies that pose the biggest threat to the interests protected by the NIS Directive.168
To this end, a regulator would first need to analyse which OES pose the biggest “inherent” risk of disrupting
societal and economic activities.169 In the air transport sector, it could be argued that ATC providers pose
a greater inherent risk than airlines, since multiple airlines may rely on a particular ATC provider. Then,
the regulator would need to consider the “management risk” of each company, namely the company’s
own ability and motivation to effectively manage and reduce the risk they pose.170 This would allow the
regulator to identify those companies that pose the highest “net risk” and prioritise those in its monitoring.
For example, the CAA plans to use the results of companies’ 2018 self-assessments and combine them
with its own threat and vulnerability information to establish a risk-based programme of ongoingmonitoring.
It will then focus on those companies where the most serious concerns have been identified and/or where
potential incidents could have the greatest impacts.171
However, there are problems with such a risk-based approach to enforcement. First, it assumes that the
company is the right level for assessing risks. As a result, regulators may miss systemic risks that apply
across the industry.172 For example, were all airlines to rely on the same cloud computing infrastructure
provider, then a single vulnerability could create an industry-wide risk. Further, companies are often part
of corporate groups subject to parent company control (e.g. British Airways is owned by International
Airlines Group, which also owns Aer Lingus, Iberia, and Vueling), such that airlines designated as OES
may share corporate systems with other airlines who are not designated as OES or, indeed, businesses
unrelated to the air transport industry, potentially giving rise to security vulnerabilities. Alternatively,
cybersecurity across the corporate group may benefit from the enhanced demands made of OES airlines
in respect of shared systems.
Risk-based enforcement further requires a regulator to make difficult judgment calls as to the motivation
and ability of different companies. There are no clear metrics for motivation, requiring regulators to make
subjective assessments. The regulator may misjudge these factors, overestimating the effectiveness of a
measure a company has put in place to prevent or mitigate damage from a particular type of risk. In that
case, the risk will continue to exist, since it is incorrectly deemed a low “net risk”. Although audits could
expose such hidden risks, regulators are less likely to submit systems they consider a low net risk to such
a high-cost assurance method.
A supplementary approachwould be for regulators to develop technical means of cybersecurity assurance
as a form of “RegTech”—i.e. the adoption of technologies to facilitate the delivery of regulatory
requirements. Thus, software could be used to automatically scans systems for known vulnerabilities and
report the results back to OES and regulators. For example, companies such as SecurityScorecard and
Upguard provide cybersecurity ratings for companies based on publicly accessible data like traffic to and
from the company. Upguard claims to base its ratings on scans of “misconfigurations”, by looking at a
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company’s online “footprint” and determining how that compares to best practices.173 This could help
regulators spot hidden risks that OES had overlooked during their own risk management.
Sanctions
Finally, the regulator can impose sanctions under the NIS Directive when appropriate risk management
measures were not in place without good reason.174 The threat of sanctions should have a deterrent effect.
For instance, a well-intentioned but underfunded IT department could use the risk of sanctions to convince
a disinterested, cost-focussed board to give it the budget it needs for additional security measures.
Under the NIS Directive, Member States must lay down rules on penalties for breaches that are effective,
proportionate, and dissuasive.175 In the UK, the regulator can issue a penalty up to a total of £17 million.176
The highest penalties are reserved for incidents resulting in an immediate threat to life or significant
adverse impact on the UK economy.177 The Government had initially proposed higher penalties, namely
at 2 per cent of global turnover for lesser offences or 4 per cent of global turnover for more serious offences,
to match the GDPR.178 However, following objections during its consultation, the Government reduced
the penalties.179 The OES can challenge the penalty decision, including the grounds for imposing the
penalty and its sum, and request that the regulator appoint an independent person to review the decision.180
Further appeals can be brought before the courts.
Finally, regulatory enforcement under the NIS Directive is not the only legal incentive for companies
to improve their cybersecurity. The GDPRwould also apply where a cybersecurity breach involves personal
data. Companies may also be exposed to private law remedies, under contract or tort, for a failure to put
in place adequate cybersecurity measures. Indeed, public laws like the NIS Directive may facilitate private
law actions by identifying standards of care to which companies can be held accountable.181
Brexit
As of the time of writing, the UK is scheduled to leave the EU on 31 January 2020. The UK Government
stated its intention that NIS Regulations will continue to apply in the UK after Brexit.182 However, it is
unclear how Brexit will affect the UK’s ability to co-ordinate with Member States in relation to
cybersecurity. For example, it is unlikely that the UK can remain a member of the European Agency for
Cybersecurity after Brexit.183 As noted above, the European Agency for Cybersecurity plays an important
role under the NIS Directive by providing guidelines for compliance and sharing best practices, including
through the NIS Coordination Group. It further provides the secretariat for the network of national CSIRTS
established under the NIS Directive.184 Third countries can participate in the European Agency for
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Cybersecurity with approval from the Commission.185As of July 2019, the Agency had three third-country
representatives as non-voting observers: Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway.186
The UK Government has stated that if it cannot remain a member of the European Agency for
Cybersecurity or the CSIRT network, it will instead rely on bilaterial relationships to share expertise and
information.187 Further, in July 2019, the UKGovernment proposed to amend NIS Regulations post-Brexit.
However, the proposal focused only on ensuring that digital service providers established outside of the
UK would nominate a representative in the UK.188 It did not address the UK’s co-operation with Member
States. That samemonth, British diplomats were reportedly disinvited from an EUmeeting on cybersecurity
standards,189 which may prove a troubling sign of things to come.
Concluding remarks
Above, we have identified two main risks in relation to the cybersecurity of companies that manage CNI.
First, absent regulation, companies that manage CNI are likely to underinvest in cybersecurity measures,
by failing to take full account of wider damages to society. Secondly, they may fail to share information
that could help other companies identify vulnerabilities and spread best practices. Poor cybersecurity can
result in service disruption, with significant socio-economic impacts. To counter this risk, the NIS Directive
requires Member States to impose safeguarding and information obligations on OES.
Safeguarding obligations aim to make the OES take account of the possible negative externalities to
society that may stem from disruptions of their service. Since what is “appropriate” and “proportionate”
will differ per company and over time, OES need to engage in an ongoing cyber risk management process.
This necessarily entails some level of subjective judgement and trade-offs between safeguards, cost and
convenience. Regulators therefore need to accord companies a significant measure of discretion in
implementation. They will have breached their obligations only when they have demonstrably failed to
take reasonably required efforts to identify, assess or address cyber risks.
The NISDirective’s risk-based approach could be undermined in twoways. First, someOESmay abuse
this discretion by only putting in place those security measures they consider to serve their own commercial
interests. OES may try to mask this approach by creating whatever security documentation the regulator
asks to see, without meaningfully changing their approach. The result could be a “paper compliance”
approach, involving lots of cybersecurity documentation, but insufficient actual cybersecurity. Such
approaches may only be unveiled when it is too late, i.e. when the company suffers a cybersecurity incident.
In that case, the NIS Directive will have failed to move CNI operators beyond the current cycle of
“complacency and panic”, but instead lead only to complacency masquerading as compliance.
Companies abusing their discretion is a general issue for principles-based regulation, but is of heightened
concern when regulating the conduct of CNI operators. Unlike the GDPR, there is no requirement to
appoint an internal expert with sufficient resources and independence to monitor and advise on compliance,
who could challenge an OES’s security decisions. As a result, the NIS Directive relies heavily on regulators
being able to discourage paper compliance. It gives regulators the relevant tools do so, by requiring
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companies to disclose security information and notify incidents. Regulators need to use these tools
pro-actively to scrutinise and challenge OES’ risk management decisions. However, to do so effectively,
regulators will need to obtain in-house expertise on cybersecurity. Further, incident notification thresholds
that focus on levels of disruption may result in “near-misses” or other non-disruptive but systemic security
breaches going unreported. Thus, regulators may need to ask OES for information on non-notifiable
security breaches and liaise with data protection or other authorities. Regulators should also clarify some
of the identified uncertainties through guidance, including the relationship between the ECI Directive and
the NIS Directive, and whether OES are required to focus only on risks of socio-economic impacts under
the NIS Directive, or should also seek to manage risks relating to safety, like loss of life. Moreover,
regulators should be mindful of clashes in national approaches, particularly where OES face the possibility
of being concurrently subject to multiple, differing sets of national rules.
Secondly, in case of a major cybersecurity breach, regulators will inevitably face considerable political
pressure to make rapid decisions, finger-point and impose punitive sanctions. There is a risk that this will
lead to scapegoating, ignoring the subtleties of the risk-based approach set out in the NIS Directive. This
could, in turn, result in legal appeals of decisions that the regulator may find difficult to defend. In sum,
while the NIS Directive serves an admirable policy goal, it remains to be seen whether it will actually
improve the cybersecurity of Europe’s critical national infrastructure.
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